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Glossary  
 
The following terms are used in this report, based on their ISO definitions1:   
Accreditation is the formal recognition by an independent body, generally known as an 
accreditation body that a certification body is capable of carrying out certification.  
Certification means the provision by an independent body of written assurance (a 
certificate) that the product, service or system in question meets specific requirements.  
Conformity assessment is the process used to show that a product, service or system 
meets specified requirements. 
A standard is a document that provides requirements, specifications, guidelines or 
characteristics that can be used consistently to ensure that materials, products, processes 
and services are fit for their purpose.  
Testing is the determination of one or more of an object or product’s characteristics and is 
usually performed by a laboratory.  	  Other	  common	  terms	  used	  within	  this	  paper	  are:	  	  
Critical	  infrastructure	  means	  an	  asset,	  system	  or	  part	  thereof	  located	  in	  Member	  States	  which	  is	  essential	  for	  the	  maintenance	  of	  vital	  societal	  functions,	  health,	  safety,	  security,	  economic	  or	  social	  well-­‐being	  of	  people,	  and	  the	  disruption	  or	  destruction	  of	  which	  would	  have	  a	  significant	  impact	  in	  a	  Member	  State	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  failure	  to	  maintain	  those	  functions.	  	  
Security	  refers	  to	  protection	  against	  threats	  by	  terrorism,	  serious	  and	  organized	  cross-­‐border	  crime,	  natural	  disasters,	  pandemics	  and	  major	  technical	  accidents.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  http://www.iso.org/iso/home/	  	  	  (NB all hyperlinks referenced in this paper were last accessed on 9 Aug 
2013).	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Abbreviations	  
 
3He Helium -3; a light, non-radioactive isotope of helium with two protons 
and one neutron 
AESA Agencia Estatal de Seguridad Aérea (Spanish Aviation Safety and 
Security Agency) 
ALMERA Analytical Laboratories for the Measurement of Environmental 
Radioactivity 
CBRNE  Chemical. Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, Explosives 
CEA Commissariat à l'énergie atomique et aux énergies alternatives (French 
Alternative Energies and Atomic Energy Commission) 
CEN  European Committee for Standardization 
CENELEC  European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization 
CEP  Common Evaluation Process 
CI  Critical Infrastructure 
CIP  Critical Infrastructure Protection 
CTM  Common Testing Methodology 
DG  Directorate-General 
DOVO Dienst voor Opruiming en Vernietiging van Ontploffingstuigen (Belgian 
Explosive Ordnance Disposal) 
ECAC  European Civil Aviation Conference 
ECI  European Critical Infrastructure 
EDS  Explosives Detection System 
EMI Fraunhofer Institute for High-Speed Dynamics, Ernst-Mach-Institut, 
(Germany) 
ENEA Agenzia nazionale per le nuove tecnologie, l'energia e lo sviluppo 
economico sostenibile (Italian National Agency for New Technologies, 
Energy and Sustainable Economic Development) 
ENISA  European Network for Information Security Agency 
EPCIP  European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection  
ERNCIP  European reference Network for Critical Infrastructure Protection 
EURATOM European Atomic Energy Community 
EU   European Union 
FOI Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut (Swedish Defence Research Agency)  
FP7   EU’s Seventh Framework Programme for Research 
GC-MS  Gas chromatography coupled to mass spectrometry 
GC-MS-MS Gas chromatography - tandem mass spectrometry 
HR  High resolution 
IACS  Industrial Automation and Control Systems  
IAEA   International Atomic Energy Agency 
ICP-MS   Inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry  
ICS  Industrial Control Systems  
ICT   Information and Communication technology 
ICT  Fraunhofer Institute for Chemical Technology (Germany) 
IEC  International Electrotechnical Commission 
ISO  International Organization for Standardization  
ITRAP+10 Illicit Trafficking Radiological Assessment Programme+10 
ITU  Institute for Transuranium Elements (of the JRC) 
JRC  Joint Research Centre (of the EU) 
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LC-MS-MS Liquid chromatography - tandem mass spectrometry  
LEDS  Liquid Explosives Detection System 
NESDE, LNEC Earthquake Engineering Division, National Laboratory for Civil 
Engineering (Portugal) 
PPP  Public-private partnership 
RN  Radiological and nuclear 
RTD  Research and Technological Development 
SCADA  Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition 
SecurEau Security and decontamination of drinking water distribution systems 
following a deliberate contamination (FP7 project) 
SERIES Seismic Engineering Research Infrastructure for European Synergies 
(FP7 project) 
SPIRIT Support of Public and Industrial Research Using Ion Beam Technology 
(FP7 project) 
SSc  Security Scanners 
SWD  Staff Working Document 
SWOT  Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats 
TAMARIS European Facility for Advanced Seismic Testing (France) 
TNO Nederlandse Organisatie voor Toegepast Natuurwetenschappelijk 
Onderzoek (Dutch Organization for Applied Scientific Research) 
TREES Lab Laboratory for Training and Research in Earthquake Engineering and 
Seismology (Italy) 
TSA  Transportation Security Administration (US) 
VÚPCH  Research Institute of Industrial Chemistry (Czech Republic)  
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Executive summary 	  
The Institute for the Protection and the Security of the Citizen of the Joint Research Centre (JRC) 
of the European Commission set up the European Reference Network for Critical Infrastructure 
Protection (ERNCIP) project in 2009. This took place under the mandate of the DG Home, and 
with the agreement of Member States. The project is due to complete at the end of 2014. 
 
One of ERNCIP’s goals is to identify gaps in European CIP-related experimental and testing 
capabilities, and to set up a wider debate on how to deal with these gaps. This report draws an 
indicative picture about the known state of European CIP-related test capabilities. The analysis is 
primarily based on an ERNCIP online questionnaire on the issue circulated at the end of 2012, 
which was completed by 65 respondents representing different types of ERNCIP stakeholders. 
The ERNCIP Thematic Groups have also provided information about their respective capabilities 
and perceived gaps in their sectors. This report aims to provoke further debate among the 
ERNCIP stakeholder communities. 
 
In some sectors, the EU has impressive CIP-related testing capabilities, although there still 
appears to be a lack of some capabilities. However, there is no detailed picture available about the 
existing capabilities, and even less about specific gaps. Instead, CIP stakeholders tend to make 
reference to general impressions about the absence of European capabilities, in terms of know-
how and infrastructure. The reason for this uncertainty may be that European-level test 
capabilities are connected to European standards, the absence of which makes it difficult to 
identify the requirements for test facilities, and therefore difficult to identify the testing 
infrastructure gaps in the EU. This also explains why there is no horizontal, cross-sectoral 
European-level plan to enhance test capabilities.  
 
For the way forward, the report recommends adoption by the EU of an overarching policy to 
improve CIP by enhancing related security solution testing capabilities, based on an approach 
which combines selectively building up test capabilities in the EU, while enhancing cooperation 
with non-EU experimental facilities and test laboratories. Under this high-level policy, 
sector/thematic-level activities will enable a focussed approach towards European testing 
capability building, coordinated with the on-going process of creating, harmonising and 
validating European security standards.  
 
Specifically, this report proposes that the methods and processes to implement this policy are 
further developed in the future work of ERNCIP. A multi-stakeholder ERNCIP workshop in 2014 
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should be arranged with the aim to agree on and prioritise the areas where gaps in test capabilities 
are perceived to prevail. Additional ERNCIP Thematic Group(s), representing all relevant 
stakeholders, would then be formed to identify and evaluate the specific capability gaps and 
development challenges in the prioritised sectors, considering the criticality, costs and other 
factors. These thematic groups would analyse the different options for meeting the capability 
gaps, including EU-led and/or EU–funded approaches, Member State–based approaches, market-
based approaches, and combinations thereof. The aim of these groups would be to produce 
detailed recommendations to the relevant funding and implementation bodies, including the 
respective EU policy areas, so that specific policy conclusions can be articulated in the relevant 
EU policy.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background – what is ERNCIP? 
 
The Institute for the Protection and the Security of the Citizen of the Joint Research Centre of the 
European Commission set up ERNCIP in 2009. This took place under the mandate of the DG 
Home, in the context of the European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP),2 
and with the agreement of Member States. The preparatory phase was successfully completed in 
November 2010 and the project started its implementation phase in February 2011.  
 
The definition for ‘critical infrastructure’ within the EPCIP context states that critical 
infrastructure “means an asset, system or part thereof located in Member States which is essential 
for the maintenance of vital societal functions, health, safety, security, economic or social well-
being of people, and the disruption or destruction of which would have a significant impact in a 
Member State as a result of the failure to maintain those functions.”3 As with EPCIP, the general 
objective of ERNCIP is to improve the protection of critical infrastructures in the EU, both 
critical national infrastructure, as well as the subset defined as European Critical Infrastructure.4 
ERNCIP works in close cooperation with all CIP stakeholders, focusing particularly on the 
technical protective security solutions.  
 
The mission of ERNCIP is - “To foster the emergence of innovative, qualified, efficient and 
competitive security solutions, through networking of European experimental capabilities”. In 
order to achieve this, ERNCIP puts its efforts into maintaining an online inventory of CIP-related 
experimental capabilities in Europe, and  into developing a network of experts to identify and 
promote good test practices to form the basis of common European testing standards, aiming at 
harmonisation of test methodologies and test protocols, where practical.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/fight_against_terrorism/l33260_en.htm.   
3 Council Directive 2008/114/EC of 8 December 2008 on the identification and designation of 
European critical infrastructures and the assessment of the need to improve their protection: 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:345:0075:0082:EN:PDF, p.  L 
345/77.   
4 While EPCIP’s scope includes also supporting the protection of national critical infrastructures in wider 
sense, the EPCIP Directive focuses only on European critical infrastructures and concentrates on the energy 
and transport sectors, where the ‘Europeanness’ is defined as follows: “‘European critical infrastructure’ or 
‘ECI’ means critical infrastructure located in Member States the disruption or destruction of which would 
have a significant impact on at least two Member States.”  
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One of ERNCIP’s goals is to identify gaps in European CIP-related experimental and testing 
capabilities, and to set up a wider debate on how to deal with them.5  ERNCIP’s starting 
assumption is that EU self-sufficiency in all aspects of testing for CIP-related security 
applications cannot be justified, but that the EU could continue to rely on world-wide 
collaboration.6 However, it is sensible for the EU to consider whether there are any CIP-related 
areas where EU self-sufficiency in testing capabilities is desirable and achievable, and also 
whether there are areas where closer cooperation with non-EU capabilities would bring greater 
value.  
 
1.2 Structure of the report 
 
This report aims to consolidate known information, and provides the basis to provoke further 
debate among ERNCIP stakeholders, with the issues presented in five sections. First, the issue of 
test capabilities is set into a wider context, assessing, on the basis of publicly available material, 
the main challenges for the EU security industry in a global perspective.  
 
One way of identifying the challenges in terms of missing European testing capabilities is to 
identify when European actors use, or are even dependent on, the services of non-EU facilities 
and laboratories. However, while there is a general understanding that the EU-US relationship is 
quite active in CIP, including EU-located actors’ use of US experimental facilities and 
laboratories for testing security solutions, there is virtually no open-source data about the extent 
and nature of this cooperation. Therefore, the ERNCIP Office prepared a questionnaire to survey 
this aspect with its stakeholders, which has provided some general views on this issue. The 
second section of this report discusses the results, covering where and why European actors 
cooperate with non-EU experimental facilities and laboratories.  
 
Third, on the basis of both the ERNCIP survey and the information provided by the ERNCIP 
Thematic Groups, a comprehensive picture is presented about the current state of European CIP-
related test capabilities. Again, while the available information is only indicative and not based on 
exhaustive data-gathering or analysis (one recommendation is for a more systematic approach to 
collect such data), some gaps in EU capabilities are apparent. The section also illustrates some of 
the activities underway that aim to fill these gaps. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 ERNCIP Roadmap 2010. This goal is detailed in WP6 (’Self-sufficiency’), pp. 95, 96. 6 ERNCIP Roadmap 2010. WP11 (‘International collaboration’), pp. 104, 105. 
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Fourth, SWOT analyses of alternative ways of meeting the needs for CIP-related testing 
capabilities are presented, covering the status quo, a more proactive approach to increase EU self-
sufficiency in security testing capabilities, enhanced international cooperation, and a combined 
approach. This section also suggests a basic methodology of how to prioritise between different 
needs to increase self-sufficiency of EU capabilities.   
  
Finally, the paper summarises the main (tentative) conclusions and recommendations, and 
proposes a general framework for further analysis and decision-making on these issues. 
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2 SETTING THE CONTEXT 
 
Setting the context is important because the notion of experimental and testing capabilities, in 
terms of expertise and infrastructure, is not an isolated issue and cannot be dealt with properly 
without also discussing related issues, such as the status of European security industry, the level 
of product standardization, the absence of common testing methodologies across the EU in many 
fields, and the absence of mutually recognized certification schemes across the EU.  
 
2.1 Global security market dominated by the US 
 
Drawing on existing market report estimates and consultation with industry representatives, the 
2009 ECORYS review7, on which the 2012 Commission staff working paper8 backing the recent 
EU Security Industrial Policy Communication 9  is largely based, estimates that the global 
“security market” is worth some €100bn. A more recent market analysis focuses on “the CIP 
market” instead, which forms a smaller sub-market of “the security market”. This 2013 
MarketsandMarkets analysis expects CIP investments to increase across the globe, with the 
expected market to grow from €50 bn in 2013 to €82 bn by 2018.10	  
 
According to the ECORYS 2009 review, the US constitutes the world’s largest market for 
security with around 41% share, as illustrated in Figure 1; the EU comes next with around 25%, 
well ahead of China, Japan, Israel and Russia. The review expects the market to grow at a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7 ECORYS (et al 2009), Study on the Competitiveness of the EU security industry. Within the Framework 
Contract for Sectoral Competitiveness Studies – ENTR/06/054, Final Report, Brussels, 15 November 2009: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/security/files/study_on_the_competitiveness_of_the_eu_security_ind
ustry_en.pdf.  The sectors covered are, except the last one, basically the same as the ERNCIP is dealing 
with currently: air transport of goods (cargo); maritime transport of goods (cargo); CBRNE; biometrics; 
secure communications; protective clothing.  8 Commission Staff  Working Paper, Security Industrial Policy. Accompanying the document, 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European 
Economic and Social Committee. Security Industrial Policy. Action Plan for an innovative and competitive 
Security Industry, Brussels, 26.7.2012 SWD(2012) 233 final. COM(2012) 417 final: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/security/files/commission_staff_working_paper_-
_security_industrial_policy_-_com(2012)_417_final_en.pdf. 9 Communication from The Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European 
Economic and Social Committee. Security Industrial Policy. Action Plan for an innovative and competitive 
Security Industry, Brussels, 26.7.2012. SWD(2012) 233 final. COM(2012) 417 final: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2012:0417:FIN:EN:PDF.  
10 MarketsandMarkets :  http://www.marketsandmarkets.com/Market-Reports/critical-infrastructure-
protection-cip-market-988.html. The figures in the text above are converted; in original, $63.76 billion in 
2013 to $105.95 billion by 2018, at a Compounded Annual Growth Rate of 10.7%. The report furthermore 
states the following: “The energy and transportation sector are highly prone to these effects because of the 
increasing levels of dependence on the information communication technologies or the information 
infrastructure. CIP other than energy and transport has a wide portfolio of applications across 
manufacturing and chemical industry, sensitive infrastructures such as stadiums, government facilities, 
manufacturing, banking facilities, historical monuments, holy places and defense establishments.”  
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minimum of 5% per annum, with the fastest growth in coming years taking place mainly in Asia 
and the Middle-East.  
 
Figure	  1: Global market shares for security (%) 
 
As a result of the inconsistent basis for these market analyses, it is difficult to draw firm 
conclusions about the comparative shares of sales achieved by the security industry according to 
country; however it is mentioned in the ECORYS review that the US companies cover over 45% 
of the global export in safety and security equipment.11  
 
In any case, it is generally perceived that the EU is clearly behind the US in this industrial sector, 
in terms of size, volume, competitiveness, and, perhaps, innovation. 
 
2.2 A need to develop EU security standards 
 
As early as 2004, the Research for a Secure Europe report, produced by the high-level ‘Group of 
Personalities’ tasked with developing the EU security research programme, noted that in the field 
of security equipment and solutions:  
• the US is taking a lead;  
• that US technology will progressively impose normative and operational standards 
worldwide; and  
• in certain areas, where the US authorities prioritize their investment and achieve fast 
product ‘speed to market’, that the US will enjoy a competitive advantage.12 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 ECORYS (et al 2009), p. 48. The figures are based on a US Security Industry Association figures from 
2006. 
12Research for a Secure Europe (2004). Report of the Group of Personalities in the field of Security 
Research. Rapporteur Burkard Schmitt:  
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/security/files/doc/gop_en.pdf. 
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The 2009 ECORYS review further concluded that while the EU has a great potential in the 
security industry, it does not utilize its possibilities through harmonizing and creating a more 
coherent European regulatory environment; thus the EU is failing to provide the necessary level 
of clarity required by industry to make investment decisions. In contrast to the EU, the US 
government, it is argued, is both more demanding (in regulation) and more accommodating (with 
federal funding programmes) in terms of technological requirements, pushing technology forward 
proactively, and by so doing also creating an environment that is more attractive for companies to 
invest in security technology development. It is further claimed in the ECORYS review that by 
developing a national system for standardization, tailored for the US needs, the US has created de 
facto unilaterally defined global security standards, which further enhances the US dominance of 
the field. Consequently the review recommended enhancing the EU-level standardization 
framework in the security field, especially in those sectors where there is absence of standards or 
where the standards differ across Member States.  
 
The 2011 ECORYS review on security regulations13 similarly concluded that a more harmonized 
European regulatory framework would provide the potential to enhance the competitiveness of 
the EU security industry, particularly by reducing the current fragmentation of EU markets, which 
is said to hamper the development of the industry, and makes security more expensive for 
customers.  
 
Indeed, following these recommendations, work towards more harmonized European regulatory 
frameworks and standards is currently taking shape in the field of security, encouraged by the 
developing EU Security Industrial Policy. In particular, this is taking place within the 
CEN/CENELEC framework under Mandate M/487 on security standards, where security refers to 
protection against threats by terrorism, serious and organized cross-border crime, natural 
disasters, pandemics and major technical accidents.14 ERNCIP and its Thematic Groups have 
been, and continue to be, facilitators and participants in activities on these priorities, especially 
those dealing with CBRNE threats, and the application of biometrics for CIP.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 ECORYS (et al 2011), Security Regulation, Conformity Assessment & Certification. Final Report – 
Volume I: Main Report, Brussels, October 2011:  
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/security/files/doc/secerca_final_report_volume__1_main_report_en.
pdf. 
14 Programming Mandate Addressed to CEN, CENELEC and the European Telecommunications Standards 
Institute to Establish Security Standards, M/487, EN, Brussels, 17th February 2011: 
ftp://ftp.cencenelec.eu/CENELEC/EuropeanMandates/M_487.pdf. 
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2.3 A need for European testing and certification schemes  
 
Commonly-agreed international or EU standards are a prerequisite to developing common EU 
test methods, simply because if there is no agreed-upon performance standard against which one 
should test, it is difficult to agree upon a common test methodology. Harmonization of standards 
should be accompanied by a mechanism for mutual recognition across the EU of products 
certified at national level, thus improving the regulative framework and infrastructure for 
validating and certifying security products.  
 
European manufacturers are particularly concerned that the current systems are costly, time-
consuming and unpredictable. While there are some tangible examples that overcome these 
shortcomings,15 this is not the general case. It is argued by manufacturers and vendors of security 
solutions that, instead of forcing them to test and certify the security products separately for 28 
markets in national testing facilities and laboratories, each following their own testing 
methodologies and requirements, it should be possible to agree upon European common test 
methodologies. When certification is needed and practical, mutually recognized certification 
schemes should be agreed. In this context, the following comment from the ERNCIP survey is 
relevant: 
 
“There is a significant variation between test labs, in terms of testing methodology, and results 
for the same tests we would expect to be the same, are not. There are very significant differences 
in terms of prerequisites and documentation required to start the tests. Duration of and urgency 
to get test done differs enormously with significant ramifications for vendors - not being able to 
sell to markets for a whole quarter or missing out on tenders.” (Vendor) 
 
Manufacturers, vendors and others using EU-based test laboratories have also indicated that 
conformity assessment and certification bodies often have a near monopoly position in their 
respective Member States. Finding this situation unsatisfactory, the users call for increased 
competition for the provision of certification services; the assumption is that a harmonized and 
mutually recognized certification system in the EU would reduce the cost and raise the quality 
and professionalism of provided services.16 
 
Ideally, it should be sufficient for a security product to be tested in one accredited European test 
laboratory in order to have access to the EU single market. This would also indirectly enhance the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 For instance, the Illicit trafficking radiation assessment programme (ITRAP+10) run by the JRC and 
funded by DG ECHO. 
16 ECORYS (et al 2011), op. cit., p. 216. 
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competitiveness of European security industry in its export efforts if the European standards and 
certification schemes were to become more generally recognized.   
 
To sum up, further development of the European security industry presupposes an improved EU-
level testing and certification scheme with enhanced approval and certification infrastructure 
either by creating a new one or harmonizing the existing national ones.    
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3 EU RELIANCE ON NON-EU CAPABILITIES 
 
The goal to further develop the European security industry, together with more harmonized 
standards, testing methodologies and certification schemes, implies the need for sufficient 
expertise, capability and capacity of experimental and testing facilities in Europe. How do we 
know whether this sufficiency exists, and how can we identify where the gaps are? One way to 
approach this issue is to ask: “to what extent are the EU-based actors (manufacturers, operators, 
government agencies, testing facilities etc.) cooperating with, using, or even dependent on, the 
services of non-EU testing facilities and laboratories, and why?”  
 
While there is no database or open-source information to definitively answer these questions, 
some general trends in this respect are revealed by the ERNCIP survey.  The survey was made 
between September and December 2012 through an anonymous, mostly online, multi-choice 
questionnaire, which also allowed for detailed free text contributions. The questionnaire was 
completed by 65 respondents representing different types of ERNCIP stakeholders, which can be 
considered as a satisfactory response.17  The main results are presented in this section. 
 
3.1 Widespread and regular international cooperation 
 
In general, the EU is open and positive towards international cooperation in the field of CIP.18 
The use by EU-located organisations of non-EU experimental facilities is part of this cooperation. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 In order to maximize the participation, the questionnaire was designed to be as simple as possible. Note 
that only some general views can be identified on this basis, and it cannot be understood as statistically 
valid. Experimental facilities and laboratories made up of around 39% of the responders, followed by 
manufacturers or vendors with 25%, national competent authorities with almost 19%, national certification 
organizations or regulators with around 9.5% and CI operators with just 3% of the responders. 
18 There is a 2011 ‘Council Conclusions on the development of the external dimension of the European 
Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection’, which invite the Member States to step up cooperation 
with relevant third countries. In the EC documents, one usually categorizes the third countries into several 
categories. 1) The EEA countries (Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein), which are invited to all EPCIP-
related meetings. 2) The United States and Canada, with whom the EU has bi- or trilateral CIP-focused 
meetings on rather regular basis as well as sub-sectoral working groups. Some individual Member States 
also refer to their bilateral (Germany, Poland, and Sweden) on-going or intended cooperation with the US, 
sometimes based on agreements, and in the case of Sweden, also including Canada.3) Russia is mentioned 
especially by Germany, those two countries having a multiannual bilateral agreement including CIP 
cooperation. Several other countries have expressed their interest in enhancing CIP cooperation with 
Russia, in particular on energy. 4) China is also mentioned by Germany referring to training in CIP-related 
matters.5) Israel has also cooperation with Germany on bilateral basis. 6) Multilateral cooperation takes 
place between the EU countries and other international organizations, most notably with the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization, and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. See: Commission Staff 
Working Document,  Review of the European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection  (EPCIP), 
Brussels, 22.6.2012, SWD(2012) 190 final:  
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/pdf/policies/crisis_and_terrorism/epcip_swd_2012_190_final.pdf.  
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The ERNCIP survey shows that EU actors use non-EU experimental facilities for testing and 
certification in the field of CIP applications for a variety of purposes, as illustrated in Figure 2.  
 
About two thirds of respondents to the ERNCIP survey regularly cooperate with non-EU 
experimental facilities in the field of Research & Technological Development (RTD) and about a 
tenth cooperate for training. This type of cooperation is not surprising for European experimental 
facilities and laboratories (representing the majority among the respondents in general), but many 
manufacturers, vendors, and operators of CI also participate in RTD or training cooperation.  
 
Figure	  2: For what purposes do organisations cooperate regularly with non-EU experimental 
facilities in testing and certification? (%, n=65) 	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According to the survey, around two thirds of respondents favour development of further 
cooperation with non-EU experimental facilities, and call for a more enhanced European 
approach to support this cooperation, as will be discussed below in more detail. The same 
message comes frequently and directly from ERNCIP stakeholders in the Thematic Group 
meetings and this was also the general spirit in the ERNCIP Conference in December 2012. 
Cooperation with US-based experimental and testing facilities, which are considered to be better 
equipped and more advanced in their capabilities, is especially appreciated as a way to enhance 
expertise.   
 
The survey does not show any specific CI sector where this type of cooperation is more common, 
nor does it suggest the forms of funding programmes under which this cooperation takes place. In 
practice, several forms of cooperation are likely. We know that in the field of radiological and 
nuclear security there is a well-established cooperation between the EU and the US Department 
of Energy. More generally, there is the EU-US expert cooperation in CIP, started in 2010, 
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although this cooperation has yet to establish any formal framework, especially on CIP-related 
RTD and training cooperation. European manufacturers often cooperate with US test facilities to 
enable sale of their products in the US.  
 
When it comes to pure research, the FP7 Framework Programme (in the next funding period 
known as Horizon 2020) is the flagship for European research cooperation.  While security 
research had been excluded in EU framework programmes before 2007, it was included from the 
beginning of FP7. In terms of cooperation with non-EU countries, FP7 allows, within specific 
funding schemes and rules depending on the country, strategic partnerships and project 
cooperation with third countries, including those playing a major role in the security industry.19 
RTD cooperation with the US has been a celebrated special case within the FP7 framework 
programme: “Transatlantic science and technology collaboration is very well developed and US 
participation represents 11% of the total non-European participation in FP7 so far. The success 
rate of US research teams winning bids is high, comparable to the success rate of many EU-based 
entities.”20 In general, there is a high-level political commitment to enhance the EU-US scientific 
and technological cooperation. Security as a field of cooperation, however, is not among the top 
fields in this EU-US cooperation, though there are some individual examples.21 
 
To contribute to this cooperation, the JRC in general (e.g. within ITRAP+10 programme22) and 
ERNCIP more specifically, has especially developed its relations with the National Institute for 
Standards and Technology23, which is a federal technology agency of the US Department of 
Commerce that works with US industry to develop and apply technology, measurements, and 
standards. While this JRC/NIST cooperation has so far been limited to exchange of information, 
it should serve as the basis for more developed exchange programmes and RTD, especially in the 
field of CIP. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/who_en.html#countries.  For the major cooperation countries in CIP for the 
EU, see footnote 18.  
20 Transatlantic Cooperation in the European Seventh Framework Programme for Research & 
Development. A Guide for U.S. Users. A resource for researchers and institutions in the USA 
to build transatlantic partnerships under the FP7 Cooperation Programme, p. 3: 
http://www.eurunion.org/FP7-USGuide-12-09.pdf. 
21 As an example of US participation in the field of security is the ‘European network for the Security of 
Control and Real-Time Systems’:  http://cordis.europa.eu/projects/rcn/87538_en.html. 
22	  http://www.dhs.gov/illicit-trafficking-radiological-assessment-program-10-itrap10.  
23 http://www.nist.gov/homeland-security-portal.cfm.  
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3.2 Why do EU actors test and certificate in non-EU facilities? 
 
As Figure 2 also shows, about half of the respondents to the ERNCIP survey informed that they 
regularly test or certify security solutions in non-EU experimental facilities. Most of those 
respondents who test security solutions outside the EU are manufacturers, vendors, or CI 
operators, with a few national competent authorities or regulators.  
 
As Figure 3 illustrates, in many cases this testing takes place simply because the manufacturers or 
vendors need to test and receive a certificate in that non-EU country in order to access that 
country’s market. Thus, around a quarter of the respondents to the ERNCIP survey use non-EU 
facilities regularly in order to get access to markets, or to satisfy the demand of the client. In 
comparison, the legal or regulatory requirements of non-EU countries were identified by only six 
per cent of respondents.  
 
Figure 3: Why do EU actors rely on non-EU experimental facilities? (%, n=65) 
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However, the survey also informs that European actors rely on non-European, mainly US 
experimental facilities to test products that are aimed at European markets, too. This may refer to 
cases where test results and certificates, especially from the US, are accepted within the EU in 
lieu of any specific European standards or certifications. An interesting fact is that about 16% of 
the respondents to the ERNCIP survey use non-EU facilities regularly because there is no 
competence in a particular field in Europe. This response and the related free text information 
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indicate clear gaps in European testing capabilities (discussed further in the next section). For 
about a tenth of the respondents, better quality is the reason to regularly use non-EU experimental 
facilities. 
 
The conclusion from the study of the ERNCIP survey results is that cooperation with the US and 
other countries’ experimental laboratories and testing facilities is appreciated by ERNCIP 
stakeholders. This cooperation, particularly in RTD and training should be enhanced with further 
coordinated programmes in order to build up the expertise of European test capabilities in CIP-
related security solutions. 
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4 WHERE ARE THE GAPS IN EUROPEAN TESTING CAPABILITIES? 
 
It is a difficult task to identify the gaps in European testing capabilities in the field of CIP-related 
security solutions in any detail. It is almost as difficult to get detailed data about the existing 
capabilities, except country-by-country or by individual laboratories. Comprehensive data does 
exist at national level about the accredited laboratories, certification, and inspection and 
verification bodies, collected by the national accreditation bodies, and organised European-wide 
by the European Cooperation of Accreditation, partially available on their website.24 In fact, there 
are several thousand accredited laboratories in the EU, with several hundred in many Member 
States, as illustrated in Figure 4.  
	  
Figure	  4: Accredited laboratories in the EU 	  
 
Source: Paolo Bianco’s presentation at the 1st ERNCIP Conference in December 2012. Figures are based on 
a 2011 survey. Following ISO/IEC 17025 (General requirements for the competence of testing and 
calibration laboratories). 
 
However, to specifically single out the CIP-related capabilities is difficult. The ERNCIP 
Inventory25 aims at filling this information gap, collecting detailed profiles of CIP-related testing 
facilities and laboratories. This Inventory is increasing its data population, reaching about 100 
facilities by August 2013. However, it has proved difficult to get some types of laboratories to 
participate, especially those within the private sector used for in-house testing only, as they see 
little benefit from advertising their expertise more widely. In any case, by definition, the ERNCIP 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 http://www.european-accreditation.org/ea-members.  
25 https://erncip.jrc.ec.europa.eu/.  
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Inventory does not identify gaps, but lists assets. Consequently, it is not possible to draw a 
holistic picture, either within a sector or across sectors, of the gaps in EU testing capabilities. 
Furthermore, the lack of product performance standards and test standards makes it difficult to 
define what infrastructure and other capabilities are needed.26 Nevertheless, this section draws a 
rough picture about the existing CIP-related capabilities in the EU in those sectors where 
ERNCIP is currently active as well as tentatively identifying the fields where gaps exist.  
 
4.1 Sectors lacking European testing capabilities 
 
When asked in the ERNCIP survey which specific CI sectors are most clearly lacking in terms of 
testing capability and/or quality in the EU (see Figure 5 below), the top three candidates were 
transport, ICT and energy, with comment made on specific issues of smart grids, explosives 
detection and resistance to explosive effects. Other sectors were mentioned by a few respondents. 
 
Typical free text comments in the context of this question are e.g.: 
 
“There are few European facilities for testing new devices related to security item, in particular 
for explosive and biohazard materials.” (Experimental facility or laboratory) 
 
“The current problem in testing to meet regulatory approval is the lack of facilities or 
expertise.” (Manufacturer or vendor in security industry) 
 
“The capability of EU explosives ranges is limited and it has been necessary to use facilities 
with larger explosive limits in non-EU countries.” (Competent government authority) 
 
“There is a lack in testing facilities on home-made explosives including characterization, effects 
and detection of explosives.” (Experimental facility or laboratory) 
 
“I am not aware of any EU testing facilities that are capable of manufacturing/ 
handling/manipulating large quantities of explosives, particularly sensitive explosives such as 
home-made explosives.” (Competent government authority) 
 
“In my field, there is a government-funded organization [in the US] that does testing on a scale 
which no individual EU Member State could afford.” (Competent government authority) 
 
“I am always amazed, when, looking at the test report [of a US facility instead of a EU facility], 
I see what tests they have done.” (Manufacturer or vendor in security industry) 
 
“More often than not, it is the experience of the personnel rather than the infrastructure that is 
the barrier to having capability”. (Competent government authority) 
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 There are, of course, exceptions. For instance, this has been defined within ITRAP+10 in the Border 
Monitoring Radiation Detection Equipment field. 
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Figure 5: In which sectors is the lack of European capability most obvious? (%, n= 65) 
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4.2 Gaps in testing identified in the ERNCIP Thematic Areas 
 
This section takes a closer look at the current state of the art of experimental and testing 
capabilities by analysing each field where ERNCIP is actively involved. ERNCIP has established 
networks of experts in nine prioritised thematic areas, which focus on specific risks to critical 
infrastructure in these areas (i.e. explosives detection in aviation and non-aviation sectors, 
industrial control systems, seismic risks against structures, explosive effects against structures, 
chemical and biological risks in water, video analytics and surveillance, applied biometrics to 
CIP, and radiological and nuclear risks to CI).27 By analysing the testing capabilities in each of 
the nine ERNCIP thematic areas in detail, different approaches to meeting the gaps are tentatively 
identified.  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 For details of these thematic areas, see: Peter Gattinesi and Christer Pursiainen, European Reference 
Networks for Critical Infrastructure Protection: Thematic Areas. State of the Art. Available in the 
European Commission PUBSY JRC82093, May 2013. 
http://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/111111111/29088/1/lbna26017enn.pdf  
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4.2.1 Aviation security detection equipment  
 
Existing capabilities 
In common with all the thematic areas, gaps in the testing capabilities required for aviation 
security will be the consequence of the need to test security solutions against the standards that 
are defined for such security solutions. 
 
There are EU regulations in place to define the basic standards for aviation security.28  In 
addition, the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) 29 has developed a testing process for 
aviation security equipment, the ECAC Common Evaluation Process (CEP30). This process is 
based on an ECAC agreed Common Testing Methodology (CTM). ECAC CTMs currently exist 
for Explosive Detection System (EDS), Liquid Explosive Detection System (LEDS) and Security 
Scanners (SSc). The ECAC CTMs are endorsed by all 44 ECAC member states (which includes 
EU-28), but they are not legally binding.  
 
Test centres made available by national authorities in ECAC member states have been approved 
by ECAC to evaluate the performance of EDS, LEDS and SSc, with the results of these 
evaluations transmitted to all ECAC member states. However, these test centres are not formally 
recognised by the European Commission, as is the case with notified bodies31 in the single market 
legislation32. Only a few EU Member States currently have ECAC-approved testing centres; 
France, Germany, Spain, the Netherlands and the UK. In addition, Switzerland operates a test 
facility.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 The main European regulatory framework, in full effect from 29 April 2010, is laid down 
by Regulation (EC) No 300/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 
March 2008 on common rules in the field of civil aviation security and repealing Regulation 
(EC) No 2320/2002: http://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/air/security/.   
29 https://www.ecac-ceac.org//activities/security.   
30 CEP represents a harmonised evaluation of different categories of security equipment, and 
provides Member States with robust and reliable information on their performance against 
set technical specifications.  
31 Certification, inspection or testing body designated by the Notifying authority of a EU 
Member State to perform the Attestation of Conformity of products within the scope of a 
New Approach Directive. Member States may add requirements for the bodies they notify. 
Additional requirements can be accreditation, participation in European co-operation, 
restrictions on subcontracting etc.: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/newapproach/nando/index.cfm?fuseaction=glossary.main.  
32 “Notified bodies carry out the tasks pertaining to the conformity assessment procedures 
referred to in the applicable technical harmonisation legislation when a third party is 
required. […] The primary task of a notified body is to provide services for conformity 
assessment under the conditions set out in the directives.” 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/single-market-goods/internal-market-for-
products/conformity-assessment-notified-bodies/index_en.htm#h2-2.   
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More generally, there are about a dozen test facilities in Europe that deal with explosive detection 
(see Table 1 in section 4.2.2). Not all test centres offer all three types of ECAC CEP tests, and 
other national aviation security testing may occur at the test centres, for example on Explosives 
Trace Detection (ETD). An important additional part of testing of aviation security equipment is 
operational trial at airports. Such trials and their results have to be reported to the Regulator (DG 
MOVE). 
 
Gaps and challenges 
While some of the EU laboratories are well equipped and match other aviation security 
laboratories like the US Department of Homeland Security's Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA) test centres, the main difference is that the TSA is a US federal authority 
establishment, whereas all the facilities in the EU are national.  
 
That there are too few test centres, implying that not all stakeholders or Member States have 
sufficient access to them, is perceived as a possible test infrastructure gap.  The ECORYS 2011 
study, which informed the EU’s work on the Security Industrial Policy, remarked:  “Also 
noticeable is the limited scale of the infrastructure for undertaking testing of these categories of 
security technologies: […]  in the aviation sector, under ECAC CEP there are only 4 test centres 
for Explosive Detection Systems (EDS) and 3 centres for Liquid Explosive Detection Systems 
(LEDS).”33 
 
Possible solutions and approaches 
The JRC is creating an aviation security laboratory to provide an in-house capability for the 
European Commission, scheduled to open in early 2014. It is hoped that this laboratory will be 
made available also to experts from the EU Member States. The concept is that the laboratory 
should allow relevant stakeholders who currently do not have access to well-equipped 
laboratories to get hands-on experience to study, for example, performance of detection 
equipment, minimum detection requirements, measurement standards and simulants.  
 
The EU work on the Security Industrial Policy, including a harmonised certification system, with 
accredited test centres, might increase the availability of aviation security test centres, as 
laboratories additional to the current ECAC-approved test centres could also be eligible to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 ECORYS (et al 2011), Security Regulation, Conformity Assessment & Certification. Final 
Report – Volume I: Main Report, Brussels, October 2011, p. 19:  
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/security/files/doc/secerca_final_report_volume__1_m
ain_report_en.pdf.	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participate as a test centre. Some of the test centres listed in Table 1 are also increasing their test 
capabilities as part of their natural development, as new regulations are enforced and new 
equipment enters the market.  
 
4.2.2 Explosives detection equipment (non-aviation)  
 
Existing capabilities  
Experimental work in explosive detection is linked to the national regulations on handling 
explosives, especially home-made explosives, which limits the number of laboratories involved in 
this area. The actual detection testing is not the only aspect to be considered for testing of 
explosives detection equipment. Other aspects include synthesis (preparation of explosives), 
characterization, and the safe storage of explosive products, which can be extremely dangerous in 
some cases. There are only a few European laboratories that have experimental facilities that can 
work on explosives detection (especially outside aviation). Table 1 (below) provides the known 
(not necessarily comprehensive) list of facilities where explosives detection can be tested in 
Europe. 
 
Gaps and Challenges 
The main concerns in this field are more related to the lack of regulations and standards in a non-
aviation context, rather than lack of testing infrastructure. Several laboratories are working on 
trace detection but no common protocols exist for the evaluation and certification of trace 
detectors. The first studies in the field are in progress in the context of ECAC, but these are only 
aimed at aviation security. Outside this area, no work has been started. Furthermore, the 
generation of samples (particles, vapours) is crucial in this field. For instance, CEA34 and 
Fraunhofer ICT35 have capabilities for calibrated gas generation. However, before we can identify 
any testing capability gaps in explosive trace detection, more work is needed at EU level to 
identify the need for common standards or guidelines in this area. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 CEA is a French government-funded technological research organisation:  http://www.cea.fr/english-
portal.  
35 The Fraunhofer Institute for Chemical Technology: http://www.ict.fraunhofer.de/en.html.  
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Table	  1: The known European testing capabilities in explosives detection  
	  
Location Test Centre Capability 
Belgium DOVO  
Czech Republic VÚPCH  
France CEA Can test all kind of detection technologies. Can 
synthetize and handle home-made explosives. 
France Service technique de 
l'aviation civile 
EDS 
Germany Federal Police Technology 
Centre/ tests done at 
Fraunhofer Institute (ICT) 
EDS, LEDS, SSc 
Can synthetize and handle home-made explosives. 
Italy ENEA Limited explosives types and quantities. 
Netherlands  TNO, Defence, Security 
and Safety 
EDS, LEDS, SSc 
Can synthetize and handle home-made explosives. 
Spain AESA SSc 
Switzerland Armasuisse LEDS  
No synthesis facilities. 
Sweden FOI Can synthetize and handle home-made explosives. 
UK  Centre for Applied Science 
and Technology  
SSc 
UK Defence Science & 
Technology Laboratory  
Can synthetize and handle home-made explosives 
 
Possible solutions and approaches 
For explosive trace detection, the ECAC common testing methodology in progress for aviation 
security will be a good basis for the testing of security solutions to meet any similar requirements 
outside aviation security, for which the ERNCIP Explosives Detection Equipment (non-Aviation) 
Thematic Group is contributing to the analysis. As already mentioned, JRC is building a 
laboratory for the evaluation of different detection technologies which will also be used outside 
aviation applications.  
 
4.2.3 Industrial automation and control systems  
 
Existing capabilities 
The EU Cybersecurity Strategy from 2013 takes up part of the issue discussed in this report, 
noting that there is “a risk that Europe not only becomes excessively dependent on ICT36 
produced elsewhere, but also on security solutions developed outside its frontiers.” While the 
strategy does not explicitly discuss testing, by strongly promoting a European single market for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Information & Communication Technology. 
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cyber security products, it implies the need for improving European test capability and adopting 
harmonized testing methods.37 
 
What then is the situation for Industrial (Automation and ) Control Systems (IACS or ICS),  for 
which Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems are the largest subgroup, 
used to monitor and control critical infrastructure?  
 
A recognized problem in this area is that while there are many standards for SCADA systems, 
there is a lack of agreement on which standards are to be used Europe-wide. In practice, from a 
manufacturer’s point of view, customers refer to many different standards and requirements, 
which results in extra costs; the industry has therefore been arguing for a clearer understanding 
of what are the minimum requirements for SCADA security in the EU.  
 
There has also been much discussion on whether a European certification scheme would be 
needed to ensure a common minimum level of security. For SCADA systems this is however a 
complicated and controversial issue, due to, inter-alia, the fact that the systems are continually 
updated with new software, and in order to test security, both the individual components and the 
whole system have to be tested. Repeated certification becomes too costly and time-consuming.  
 
Whether or not a common certification scheme is needed, SCADA systems have to be security 
tested. Currently the manufacturers, vendors and in some cases also operators do most of the 
testing in their own facilities, or they use specialized test services and laboratories, often working 
globally. Some of the major test laboratories are US-based.    
 
Gaps and challenges 
The current ICS/SCADA tests are conducted on several levels, usually including at least the 
component, subsystem and whole system levels. However, what cannot be tested easily, and what 
is not usually therefore tested at all in Europe, is the system-of-systems level, including 
interoperability with other systems and possible failure propagation and cascading effects due to 
unpredicted or complex interdependencies (e.g. physical/cyber interdependencies between  a gas 
pipeline, an electricity grid and the related SCADA systems).38 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions. Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union: An Open, 
Safe and Secure Cyberspace,  Brussels, 7.2.2013, JOIN(2013) 1 final, p. 12:  http://ec.europa.eu/digital-
agenda/en/news/eu-cybersecurity-plan-protect-open-internet-and-online-freedom-and-opportunity-cyber-
security.   
38 See: Irene Eusgeld, Cen Nan and Sven Dietz,  ‘System-of-systems’’ approach for interdependent critical 
infrastructures’,  Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Volume 96, Issue 6, June 2011, pp. 679–686. 
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These interdependencies are difficult to model and simulate, but even more difficult to test in an 
operational environment. While there are some ICT cyber security test facilities in Europe, they 
cannot be used in their current form to fully test the security of ICS because it is not possible to 
perform actual operational tests with the ICS connected to actual critical infrastructures. Unlike in 
the US, there are no testing facilities in Europe which can connect ICS to infrastructure, such as 
an electricity grid (instead of relying on simulated tests).  How the ICS/SCADA security tests are 
exactly conducted by the manufacturers and vendors, be it in Europe or in the US, is not 
transparent however, as these actors are reluctant to detail their test methodologies on the basis of 
competitive advantage.   
 
Perhaps partly for this reason, a fundamental question, which has been around for a long time, is 
whether there should be a more ‘independent’ European test bed for SCADA systems, separate 
from manufacturers’ and vendors’ in-house testing.39 Recently the EU-agency European Network 
for Information Security (ENISA) raised this issue in the context of ICS. 40  
 
Possible solutions and approaches 
ENISA is the main driving force within the EU that is identifying the problems related to 
SCADA/IACS testing.  ENISA’s current approach is that Europe has to make a choice between 
two alternatives. Either the EU should create a common test bed at European level based on a 
Public-Private Partnership, aiming at “conducting independent verification and validation tests 
[…] in a controlled environment, ensuring integrity and increasing the trustfulness on 
certified/tested solutions. Moreover it will provide operators with independent security 
evaluations and a common security reference so that they are supported when deciding which 
products/services to buy.” Alternatively, ENISA proposes, the EU should create a common ICS 
security certification framework based on the Member States’ existing certification systems and, 
possibly, a European coordination group to avoid duplicated work so that “once a product is 
certified in a Member State’s national laboratories, it wouldn’t be necessary to certify it once 
again.”41 This implies that the testing capabilities of the Member States’ national laboratories 
would need to be harmonised/upgraded to the required level. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 E.g. Henrik Christiansson and Eric Luiijf, ‘Creating a European SCADA Security Testbed’, Critical 
Infrastructure Protection, IFIP International Federation for Information Processing Volume 253, 2007, 
pp. 237-247. 
40 ENISA, Protecting Industrial Control Systems Recommendations for Europe and Member States  
[Deliverable – 2011-12-09], Recommendation #5, p. 45:  http://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/Resilience-
and-CIIP/critical-infrastructure-and-services/scada-industrial-control-systems/protecting-industrial-control-
systems.-recommendations-for-europe-and-member-states.   
41 Ibid. 
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Currently, a report, based on a survey among the different stakeholders, is being prepared by 
ENISA to continue the discussion on which of these alternatives the EU should opt for. 
 
4.2.4 Structural resistance against seismic risks  
 
Existing capabilities 
An existing FP7 project, SERIES (which also provides the core of the ERNCIP Thematic Group 
in this field) has gathered together 24 partners, and includes all the key actors and capabilities in 
Europe’s seismic engineering research, including seven world-class seismic testing centres, listed 
in Table 2 below. 
 
Table	  2: Main European seismic engineering experimental capabilities	  
 
Location Test centre Capability 
Nantes, France IFSTTAR (ex-LCPC)  Centrifuge facility 
Saclay, France TAMARIS, CEA EU’s largest 6-degree-of-freedom (6DoF) Shaking table 
Pavia, Italy TREES Lab, EUCENTRE EU’s largest Uniaxial Shaking Table and Bearings Tester 
Ispra, Italy European Laboratory for 
Structural Assessment, JRC 
EU’s largest reaction wall & Power Spectral Density lab 
Lisbon, Portugal  NESDE, LNEC Large 3DoF Shaking table 
Bristol, UK BLADE, University of Bristol  6DoF earthquake Shaking table 
Cambridge, UK  University of Cambridge  Centrifuge facility 
 
 
Gaps and challenges 
SERIES resulted from its initiators acknowledging that there are some gaps in European seismic 
engineering capabilities, and that European seismic engineering is lagging behind the US, Japan 
and increasingly also the Chinese capabilities. Existing capabilities in Europe are unevenly 
distributed: there are European countries with high seismicity but no research infrastructures, and 
countries with large research infrastructures but low seismicity. There is an unused potential in 
Europe for the scientific and technical community to pursue promising research ideas, because of 
lack of access to research infrastructure. 
 
Possible solutions and approaches 
To resolve the identified gaps, the SERIES project was established as a capacity and capability 
building project, aiming at enhancing the European capabilities in experimental seismic 
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engineering by better integration of existing capability. The two main ways SERIES is enhancing 
European capabilities are: 
• Implementation and maintenance of a Distributed Database of test results, which allows 
the research community to get access to a huge amount of data from earlier research. 
• Through the FP7 project funding (to be ended in 2013), a peer review system which 
provides a free-of-charge access to the European test centres, listed in Table 2, to those 
EU countries, companies, research facilities lacking of experimental capabilities but 
having an experimental need.  
 
4.2.5 Resistance of structures against explosion effects 
 
Existing capabilities 
There are three different types of testing methods applicable for blast resistance testing: a) direct 
high-explosive testing, b) shock tube testing, c) and numerical simulations. Around Europe only a 
very limited number of experimental facilities and laboratories deal with the structural resistance 
of constructions against explosives threats.  
 
The key players in this field are all included in the ERNCIP Thematic Group, as listed in Table 3 
below; beside these, only some small laboratories deal with the topic (e.g. Spiez in Switzerland). 
These smaller laboratories usually have testing facilities for only fundamental laboratory tests like 
the Hopkinson Pressure Bar, which is able to determine the dynamic resistance of concrete, but 
cannot directly test the resistance against explosion.  
 
Table	   3: Main European experimental capabilities dealing with structural resistance against 
explosives	  
 
Location  Test centre  Capability 
  Direct high explosives 
test 
Shock tube 
test 
Numerical 
simulation 
Germany Technical Centre(s) of the 
German Armed Forces (WTD) 
X X X 
Germany Federal Institute for Materials 
Research and Testing (BAM) 
X  X 
Germany  Fraunhofer Institute (EMI) X  (scaled experiments) X X 
UK  GL Noble Denton, Spadeadam  X   
France   CEA, Gramat X  (scaled experiments)  X 
Netherlands TNO  X X 
Finland  Technical Research Centre of 
Finland (VTT) 
  X 
EC JRC   X 
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Gaps and challenges 
The information from the ERNCIP survey indicates that there are gaps in explosive-related 
experimental and testing capabilities in the EU, especially from the limitations in the amount of 
explosive. On the other hand, the information from the ERNCIP Thematic Group indicates that it 
is not the experimental capacities that are missing, but that the regulative framework to conduct 
these kinds of tests for critical infrastructure is absent. There are no regulations that bind the 
operator of a critical infrastructure to consider the resistance of against explosive threats. As long 
as such testing is purely voluntary, most operators will not test against these threats, since this 
will cost money. In respect to blast resistance of buildings, international standards exist only for 
the test and classification of glazing used in buildings.  
 
Possible solutions and approaches 
This ERNCIP Thematic Group aims at addressing the regulative gap, by creating the basis for 
harmonized and comparable test methodologies. In addition, there are FP7 projects (e.g. 
SPIRIT42) which also address the security of constructions against explosive threats.  
 
4.2.6 Chemical and biological risks in the water sector 
 
Existing capabilities 
In general, organisational structures and scientific methods today provide a high-level control 
mechanism for environmental water resources and for drinking water. First, there exist national 
accredited laboratories in all EU countries to test water quality. Second, well-developed European 
regulatory frameworks also exist to protect environmental water resources from pollution and to 
guarantee a good chemical and ecological status of environmental water resources, as well as to 
set quality standards for drinking water at the tap. The European regulations define rather 
carefully the normal substances permitted in drinking water as well as the list of pollutants, such 
as heavy metals, and their acceptable limits.   
 
The current system is however designed for long-term decision making and not for immediate 
response in case of an incident. Generally, laboratories of the drinking water companies specialise 
in routine analysis, which does not require special equipment that involves high costs for their 
acquisition and specialized personnel. The number of parameters analysed by such laboratories is 
established in accordance with the requirements of the legislation and only in few cases do they 
perform research activity for developing analytical methods for other possible pollutants. Water 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42	  http://www.spirit-­‐ion.eu/Project.html	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operators and authorities are not interested in analytical methods for substances which are not 
included in regulations or EU Directives and this is one of the reasons why laboratories are not 
stimulated to develop such methods. For this reason they cannot perform a rapid investigation of 
unknown pollutants to respond to an unexpected event.  
 
However, innovative water quality monitoring systems have been developed in the last couple of 
years which allow for real-time control of the overall water quality. These systems react to a 
number of classes of contaminants and can immediately warn operators and decision makers of 
potential contamination in the network. Classical analytical approaches are then needed in order 
to identify and quantify individual chemical or biological contaminants that are the cause of a 
change in water quality.  
 
Gaps and challenges 
Incident response can be divided into two challenges. Real-time monitoring of water quality in 
drinking water networks is the first challenge, working as an early-warning system.  Several tools 
have been developed to identify the water quality in the event of an incident. However, there is no 
EU standard approach that sets out the assessment parameters, for real-time monitoring of 
drinking water (raw water, blended water etc.) which would help to avoid false alarms and ensure 
that the sensors are working properly.  
 
This lack of a standard approach is mirrored by the lack of relevant test capabilities in the existing 
laboratories. Several studies provide information on testing procedures or report testing of sensors 
and their suitability as early warning system. However a common testing guideline is missing 
which would facilitate placing sensors/early warning systems on the European market by setting 
out the relevant procedures, and the pollutants to be tested. Testing sensors in real water treatment 
systems is usually impossible, and simulated or laboratory tests cannot easily replicate the real 
environment. To test these types of early warning systems, sensors need to be placed in artificial 
water networks, so that the water can be spiked with different chemicals/pathogens, and the 
response evaluated. This will require a laboratory-scale drinking water network(s) to be created in 
Europe. However, such facilities would be costly, and in any case would be restricted to testing 
only with defined pollutants. 
 
Screening methods for the rapid analytical identification and quantification of unknown hazards 
(biological and chemical pollutants) are the other challenge for incident response. Qualitative 
screening for hazards does not necessarily need special instruments, as this can be carried out by 
standard equipment which is commonly used in testing laboratories. However, the broad 
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application of screening is limited, as there is not a wide market for this purpose and therefore 
screening methods are not normally used in routine testing programs.  
 
More thorough investigation can be done by laboratories from research institutes and national 
authorities which are well equipped with most of the equipment necessary for performing 
screening analysis of unknown substances,43 have personnel with a high level of expertise in this 
field, and which develop new methods of analysis for different types of organic pollutants, in the 
frame of research projects. On the other hand, most of the results of research activity remain 
unknown to standardization bodies, to regulatory authorities and even to water operators who can 
only obtain such information from published articles or in conferences.  
 
Therefore, in order to deliver valid and robust (and all-embracing) results, screening methods 
have to be established and laboratories have to continually deal with these methods, which in turn 
requires a market for this purpose. Molecular techniques such as polymerase chain reaction 
provide sensitive, rapid and quantitative analyses for a number of pathogens (including emerging 
strains) and are applied by a number of laboratories in Europe to evaluate the microbiological 
quality of water by facilitating identification, genotyping, enumeration and pathogens viability. 
Again, this technique requires experience and refinement to be applicable to a diversity of 
matrixes, and hence a high throughput of samples.  
 
European expertise in the analysis of non-targeted compounds in water exists in only a few EU 
Member States (especially Germany, Spain, the Netherlands), and in Switzerland.44 “Unknown” 
contaminants are a challenge because a high number of chemicals have to be taken into account 
and special screening methods have to be applied to identify substances, although chemical and 
physical characteristics do limit the number of possible chemicals that might be a threat to water 
networks. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 To illustrate, for instance, in Romania alone, there are 128 accredited laboratories having as profile of 
activity analytical investigation of water quality. From these, 82 laboratories perform routine or temporary 
analytical control of drinking water (laboratories from drinking water companies, from public health 
authority and water authority, research institutes and private laboratories). Laboratories which belong to 
national authorities and research institutes combine analytical investigations with development of new 
testing methods which is why they have modern equipment like: gas chromatography coupled to mass 
spectrometry (GC-MS, all of them) , gas chromatography - tandem mass spectrometry (GC-MS-MS), High 
resolution (HR-) liquid chromatography - tandem mass spectrometry (LC-MS-MS) for identification of 
unknown organic pollutants (screening analysis) and also for quantitative analysis; inductively coupled 
plasma mass spectrometry (ICP-MS, for metal identification and quantification). Approximately seven 
laboratories from Romania have such expertise. 
44 This conclusion was drawn in a literature study undertaken by the ERNCIP TG on Chemical and 
Biological Risk to the Water Sector: Sara Rodriguez-Mozaz and Marta Llorca, State-of-the-art of screening 
methods for the rapid identification of chemicals in drinking water. To be published on the ERNCIP 
website in September 2013. 
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Besides conventional molecular techniques, a promising approach for monitoring drinking water 
pathogens is nanomaterial-enabled biosensors. However, although a range of sensors have been 
developed, the suitability of these assays for whole-cell and microorganism detection in 
environmental samples has typically not been established.  
 
Possible solutions and approaches 
As discussed above, the issue here is that while testing is obligatory for several substances, it is 
not for many toxic substances, even if this is now possible through available methods, equipment 
and know-how. Part of the problem is the missing standards, but also that the necessary expertise 
is not developed where the testing is not part of routine testing. 
 
Biological and chemical risks in drinking water are within the scope of the CEN/CENELEC 
mandate to develop security standards. Simultaneously, there are also several projects and 
networks underway, which also deal with the above mentioned issues, or parts of them. Beside 
the ERNCIP Thematic Group, dedicated to reviewing the existing practices and providing 
guidelines for testing new technologies, the FP7 project SecurEau, for instance, dealt with 
security and rapid decontamination of drinking water distribution systems following a deliberate 
contamination,45 and FP7 project SIPE is promoting and increasing the use of existing research 
results in support of further standardization.46  
 
In terms of testing infrastructure, there are also on-going national projects to build up artificial 
water networks, which would enable the testing of the instruments and methods for early warning 
for contaminated drinking water.  
 
4.2.7 Video analytics and surveillance & applied biometrics 
 
In the case of emerging technologies such as video surveillance and biometrics in the context of 
CIP, the main issue is whether there exist sufficient quality datasets against which the commercial 
security applications can be tested. While no comprehensive picture exists of the availability of 
datasets across the EU Member States, individual Member States and institutions, especially in 
the UK, France and Germany, have considerable capabilities to this effect.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 See the project’s website: http://www.secureau.eu/index.php?id=3.   
46 See the project’s website: http://www.sipe-rtd.eu/ .  
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Thus, there are methods, literature and datasets for the event detection scenarios available for the 
evaluation, testing, and validation of commercially available video analytics systems, and there 
exists a wide range of user guidance documents intended to help users develop effective CCTV 
systems for security applications.47 In biometrics, too, some datasets exist that are used to test and 
compare the applications.  
 
The “European problem” here is that the datasets are not standardised between countries or test 
facilities, so that a system tested in one country is not necessarily tested with the same parameters 
in another country. A related issue is that due to the nature of the content of these datasets, there 
are inhibitors to sharing the datasets for privacy or other legal reasons. One possible solution 
might be to share the datasets on a metadata level which would make it possible to establish a 
more harmonised test methodology in the EU within these fields. 
 
4.2.8 Radiological and nuclear threats to critical infrastructures 
 
Existing capabilities 
There are many experimental facilities and test laboratories in the field of radiological and 
nuclear (RN) risks in the EU. The main database listing these is the IAEA-administrated 
ALMERA network (Analytical Laboratories for the Measurement of Environmental 
Radioactivity), established in 1995, which is a cooperative effort of analytical laboratories world-
wide.48 Members of ALMERA are nominated by their respective IAEA Member States as 
laboratories that would be expected to provide continuous, reliable and timely analysis of 
environmental samples, according to EURATOM Treaty articles 35 and 36, including in the event 
of an accidental or intentional release of radioactivity. Currently ALMERA consists of 128 
laboratories representing 81 countries, including 66 European laboratories.  
 
There are, however, only a few laboratories that have the capabilities and capacities for testing 
and qualifying technologies and methodologies related to RN security. In Europe, the JRC has 
been entrusted by the European Commission to set up a dedicated facility for testing the 
technology used for the detection and the identification of RN materials.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 See, for instance, examples from the UK and France: http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/science-
research/hosdb/i-lids/; http://www-sop.inria.fr/members/Francois.Bremond/topicsText/etiseoProject.html; 
http://www-sop.inria.fr/members/Slawomir.Bak/gpEasy/DataSet. 
48 http://nucleus.iaea.org/rpst/ReferenceProducts/ALMERA/ALMERA_Member_Laboratories/index.htm.  
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Gaps and challenges 
Technological development, combined with threats arising from security rather than safety 
concerns, are bringing about new challenges and also new gaps in experimental and testing 
capabilities. In many applications, spectrometers are replacing counters as radiation detectors. As 
an example, during security missions with a task to detect radioactivity, the background gamma-
ray count-rate of the detector changes continuously. Only the spectrometer is able to tell whether 
the observed variation is caused by the naturally-occurring radionuclides or by artificially-
produced radionuclides used in malicious acts.  
 
For stand-off detection exercises (source-to-detector distance >10 m),49 important from the 
security point of view, high-activity sources are required. However, institutes typically have few, 
if any, high-activity sources in-house. Obtaining them comes with the obligation of secure 
storage, handling, bookkeeping etc. Moving them between institutes is probably less feasible than 
organizing tests in the source owner institute. Organizing stand-off-detection tests in other 
organizations usually requires a lot of effort, planning and good-will. There are also several 
materials such as weapons-grade plutonium or highly enriched uranium that are not commercially 
available in large quantities. Other than for national work by the larger EU nuclear countries, tests 
with these materials need to be organized at the JRC’s nuclear security unit, the Institute for 
Transuranium Elements (ITU) in Karlsruhe, Germany.  
  
Another complication related to security-driven testing is that often either the source or the 
detector needs to be moved in a controlled manner.  In addition to tests with unshielded sources, 
different types of evasive (shielding, masking) scenarios should also be considered. For example, 
the shape of the energy spectrum changes if shielding is introduced. Different types of source 
shields should be designed and built in advance to allow the controlled and comprehensive 
performance evaluation of the detectors. Detectors used in safety and security also need to be 
tested at high radiation levels, and therefore their dynamic range of operation has to be well 
characterized. Moreover, factors such as insensitivity of gamma detectors to neutrons, and vice 
versa, need to be experimentally examined.  
 
3He counters are very common neutron detectors. The required 3He is a side-product of nuclear 
weapons fabrication. Diminished production of nuclear weapons and increased demand of 
neutron detectors (e.g. homeland security projects) has boosted the research and development of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 For nuclear/radiological security, the location of the source is often unknown, and therefore exercises will 
use comparatively long source-to-detector distances.  
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alternative ways to detect neutrons. Both direct and indirect techniques are actively being studied. 
Testing with neutrons is complicated because the environment where the tests are done also 
influences the results. Neutrons from the source act like billiard balls that can collide with walls 
many times before even reaching the detector. As the count rate of the detector may not follow 
the 1/r2 law, where r is the source-to-detector distance, the test facility needs to have large 
dimensions so that all surfaces are far enough away from the source and from the detector.  This 
is not often the case.  
 
Some detector manufacturing companies have their own (usually) nationally-accredited 
laboratories. However, seldom do they have strong metrologically traceable sources in them, and 
in these cases they have to rely on better-equipped laboratories.  
 
Possible solutions and approaches 
The testing facilities that the new security-driven developments demand for the performance 
evaluation, especially concerning radiation detectors, are currently been built by some EU 
Member States as well as  by the IAEA and the JRC. The EU has recently contributed to making 
it possible for all EU Member States and their relevant stakeholders to have the necessary access 
to test facilities within the ITRAP+10 project. Thus, the JRC’s ITU has opened two new 
laboratories exclusively dedicated to the static and dynamic testing of nuclear security detection 
equipment. The capabilities include testing new technologies with alternative 3He neutron 
detectors.50 This example, where all the manufacturers in Europe have participated with their 
equipment to the test campaign organised by the JRC, is a unique example of effective 
collaboration. 
 
Simultaneously, as recommended by the EU CBRN Action plan adopted by the European 
Council in December 200951, the European Nuclear Security Training centre (EUSECTRA) has 
been established by the JRC in Karlsruhe to serve as a platform for knowledge transfer and for 
networking of experts. The facility offers a comprehensive training scheme for first responders, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 The tests, developed jointly with the US partners under the coordination of Domestic Nuclear Detection 
Office (DNDO) and with the collaboration of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), are mainly 
based on the ANSI and IEC standards. See 
http://itu.jrc.ec.europa.eu/fileadmin/EUSECTRA/ITRAP%2B10%20hand%20held%20lab.pdf and 
http://itu.jrc.ec.europa.eu/fileadmin/EUSECTRA/ITRAP%2B10developments_dynamic.pdf. 
51 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on Strengthening 
Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Security in the European Union – an EU CBRN Action 
Plan,  Brussels, 24.6.2009 COM(2009) 273 final: http://ec.europa.eu/home-
affairs/summary/docs/com_2009_0273_en.pdf. See also: 
http://itu.jrc.ec.europa.eu/index.php?id=36&type=0&iEntryUID=246&iEntryPID=68 and 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-338_en.htm.  
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measurement expert support teams and nuclear forensic experts comprising practical and table-
top exercises.  
 
Thus, while there still are challenges and possible gaps within the field of RN testing in the EU, 
these challenges are well identified and the processes dealing with them are in place. 
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5 OPTIONS FOR ENHANCING EU CAPABILITIES 
 
The Security Industrial Policy Action Plan Communication52 sets forward a master plan to 
enhance the European security industry, highlighting especially the gap between the European 
and US industries as well as the upcoming challenges from the Asian industries. Identifying the 
fragmentation of the European security market as a key obstacle, the Communication’s focus is 
on European-level standardisation and certification. Furthermore it takes up issues such as how to 
reduce the time from research to market.  
 
However, the Communication does not explicitly deal with the question of testing, nor is there 
any other European-level debate or plan on how to enhance the capabilities for testing security 
solutions from the current level, beyond normal national and company-level development plans, 
and some sectoral developments, e.g. in the RN field, as discussed in this paper. A more 
concerted approach is needed to enhance European CIP-related testing capabilities. This section 
considers the pros and cons of the different approaches that could be taken at EU level to enhance 
testing capabilities. 
 
5.1 Alternative approaches 
 
The ERNCIP survey presented to respondents three options which could form an approach to 
enhance the testing capabilities in the field of CIP security solutions. As Figure 5 shows, an 
overwhelming majority of respondents supported a more consolidated approach to enhance 
EU/non-EU cooperation. The approach to set up a more self-sufficient EU capacity in 
experimental CIP facilities and laboratories received support from almost a third of the 
responders, whereas the status quo option, i.e. do nothing, was supported only by a tenth of the 
respondents. This result clearly signals a demand for change.  The results also show that there is 
some support to combine options 2 and 3, i.e. striving for EU self-sufficiency while at the same 
time enhance cooperation with non-EU actors.    
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European 
Economic and Social Committee. Security Industrial Policy. Action Plan for an innovative and competitive 
Security Industry Brussels, 26.7.2012. SWD(2012) 233 final. COM(2012) 417 final: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2012:0417:FIN:EN:PDF.  
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Figure 6: Best way to go ahead (%, n= 65) 
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On the basis of these results, we have considered the four most plausible alternatives in some 
detail, using SWOT analyses, where the internal SWOT dimension refers to each approach’s own 
strengths/merits or weaknesses/demerits, and the external SWOT dimension refers to possible 
contextual opportunities and threats that may affect the outcome of the respective approach. The 
four approaches are: 
 
1) Maintain the status quo;  
2) Set up a more self-sufficient EU test capability;  
3) A more consolidated approach to cooperation with non-EU laboratories;  
4)  A combination of approaches 2) and 3). 
 
5.2 ‘Status quo’ 
 
No evidence of plans or on-going debate concerning the level of European experimental and 
testing capabilities has been identified outside of ERNCIP, which implies no need exists for an 
EU-level programme to enhance the experimental and testing capabilities. However, making no 
change to the current situation received the lowest support among the ERNCIP survey 
respondents (less than 8 %), which indicates that stakeholders are dissatisfied with the current 
situation.   
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Figure 7:	  SWOT of ‘Status quo’ approach to testing capabilities in the EU 
 
 
The positive sides of this option, as presented in Figure 7, are based on the argument that Europe 
already has several experimental facilities and laboratories for testing security solutions, and good 
capacity and capability in most fields. This report has shown that the current problem areas may 
be more due to the lack of harmonised regulatory frameworks than to lack of testing capability. 
This option assumes that normal market forces should and would meet any need for additional 
testing capabilities, and that the EU can continue to benefit from the current ‘free riding’ on the 
capabilities of other nations, especially on US experimental and testing facilities.  
 
This passive approach has the disadvantage that it does not encourage further development of 
capability. The EU may lose the initiative in technology development, and it will not capitalise on 
all the potential within the EU. A system based on reliance on outside capabilities may also 
discriminate against some EU-based companies vis-à-vis non-EU companies, and does not 
support the European security industry, and associated RTD.  Most notably, from the security 
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point of view, the status quo approach leaves Europe dependent on outside testing capabilities and 
capacities that might not be always available when needed.  
 
5.3 ‘Self-sufficiency’ 
 
Greater self-sufficiency in the EU in the capabilities to test security solutions was supported by 
around 35% of respondents to the ERNCIP survey. The SWOT analysis of this option in Figure 8 
below presents some clear benefits.  
 
Figure 8: SWOT of building up EU ‘Self-sufficiency’ in testing capabilities 
 
 
 
Most notably, it would make the EU less dependent on outside capabilities in fields that might 
become critical and difficult to access in future emergency situations. It would be a more 
proactive approach, which implies more RTD investments in the security industry, requiring an 
active EU policy to this effect. Another important benefit of a test capability independent from 
the US is that it could better take into account any specific European needs.  
 
On the negative side, the approach will require increased investment and it is unclear where the 
responsibility to build up this self-sufficiency would best lie; with the EU, the Member States, the 
laboratories, or the security industry (companies)? 
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5.4 ‘International cooperation’ 
 
The third option to enhance the testing capabilities offered in the ERNCIP survey was more 
cooperation with non-EU experimental facilities and laboratories, which obtained most support 
(61%).   
 
Figure 9: SWOT of enhancing ‘International cooperation’ 	  
 
This option is similar to the ‘Status quo’ but it makes more use of international cooperation than 
is today the case. In a sense it enhances European testing capabilities but only in terms of know-
how. Otherwise it bears the same pros and cons as the ‘Status quo’.    
 
5.5 Selected ‘Self-sufficiency’ with more ‘International cooperation’ 
 
The fourth option is a combination of the two previous approaches: enhance Europe’s own 
capabilities in some areas while at the same time making full use of the cooperation potential. On 
the basis of the ERNCIP survey, this approach would perhaps best satisfy the needs of most CIP 
stakeholders.  
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Figure 10: SWOT of selected 'Self-sufficiency' and enhanced 'International cooperation' 
 
 
This option would combine the best parts of the previous two alternative approaches. In fact, this 
kind of approach has previously been proposed. Among others, the previously-mentioned 2004 
Research for a Secure Europe report53 notes that in many cases US options could meet also a 
number of Europe’s needs, and that Europe’s response should include not one but a variety of 
approaches, depending on the type of technologies. Emphasis for greater cooperation should be 
placed on security areas that require a particularly high degree of international cooperation. 
However, for the most critical security technologies, and also for technologies where 
requirements in Europe are different, Europe should consider an indigenous competitive 
capability, even if this involves duplication of US capabilities. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53Research for a Secure Europe (2004), op. cit.  
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5.6 Prioritisation methods for increasing self-sufficiency 
 
How might the EU be able decide on the areas that would justify self-sufficient capabilities? As 
illustrated in Table 4, a starting point could be to look at two factors: the criticality of the missing 
capability for security testing, and the costs involved.  
 
The resulting matrix could then be used to produce priorities for EU actions. In this theoretical 
example, five priorities are suggested, ranging from 1 (High) to 5 (Low), but the complexity and 
categorisation can be modified to suit the requirements of the stakeholders. If a missing specific 
testing capability has a high criticality to Europe’s security, and at the same time would involve 
low costs, this would fall into the top priority (Priority 1), as a potential “quick win”. Similarly, a 
very costly investment in a capability which has a low criticality should be prioritized lowly 
(Priority 5). Clearly, the decision-making for EU-level investments will need to be based on well-
informed analysis. 
 
Table	  4:	  A	  theoretical	  method	  of	  prioritisation 
 
Capability 
lacks 
Costs and other resources/time needed to build self-sufficiency 
 
Criticality 
of the 
missing 
capability/ 
Specific EU 
needs 
 Low Medium High 
High Priority 1 (“quick 
wins”) 
Priority 2 Priority 3 
 
Medium Priority 1 (“quick 
wins”) 
Priority 3 Priority 4 
 
Low Priority 2 Priority 4 Priority 5 
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6 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
This paper provides tentative findings about the gaps in European experimental and test 
capabilities for CIP-related security solutions. This section summarises the key conclusions and 
makes recommendations, for a possible way forward.  
 
6.1 Conclusions on the current situation  
 
EU lacks some experimental and test capabilities. ERNCIP stakeholders cooperate with non-
EU experimental facilities and test laboratories not only in order to receive certification for access 
to the respective non-EU countries’ markets, but also because they do not find necessary test 
capabilities in the EU. From the ERNCIP survey and from the information received from 
ERNCIP Thematic Groups, it is obvious that there are some gaps – though not in all fields - in the 
EU both in terms of expertise and know-how as well as test infrastructure and equipment. 
No detailed picture is available about the capabilities and gaps. There is no single actor who 
has a holistic, cross-sector picture of the EU experimental and test capabilities for CIP-related 
security solutions. Even within separate sectors, the available data turns out to be fragmented and 
superficial; the laboratories are usually aware of only their own capabilities, and if the capabilities 
are hard to list, it is even more difficult to confirm the gaps. 
Test capabilities are related to standards. The notion of EU experimental and testing 
capabilities for CIP-related security solutions is closely connected to the issue of common 
international or European standards, common test methodologies and mutually recognized 
certification schemes. In the absence of these, it is difficult to assess what are the requirements for 
a test facility, and where exactly the serious gaps are in the EU in this context.  
Multiple ways to enhance capabilities. The examples discussed in this paper show that there are 
multiple ways to fill in capability gaps: sometimes capability enhancement is taken care by 
market forces (companies build up their laboratories); EU-funded projects have introduced 
innovative resource pooling practices; Member States have upgraded their national capabilities by 
direct funding; Member States together with the EU have agreed upon capability building, e.g. in 
the context of the JRC; public-private partnerships (PPP) have been used.  
No overall European master plan to enhance test capabilities. There is however no horizontal, 
cross-cutting European master plan on how to identify and fill in the gaps in CIP-related testing 
capabilities. Within some sectors, such as radiological and nuclear risks, there are examples of 
how the European experimental and test capabilities have been enhanced and the identified gaps 
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filled in.  The experience shows that to achieve an effective and tangible solution, a gap, and the 
respective need to fill it, have to be articulated in an EU policy document (cf. EU CBRN Action 
Plan), with a clear mandate, implementation structure and necessary funding.     
6.2 Recommended way forward 	  
6.2.1 High-level approach 
For the way forward, this report recommends adoption by the EU of an overarching policy to 
improve CIP by enhancing EU CIP-related security solution testing capabilities, based on an 
approach which combines selectively building up test capabilities in the EU, while enhancing 
cooperation with non-EU experimental facilities and test laboratories. As the primary driver of 
this policy will be the improvement of CIP in the EU, this policy should come under the umbrella 
of the EPCIP programme, being managed by DG HOME 
 
Under this high-level policy, sector/thematic-level activities will enable a focussed approach 
towards European testing capability building, coordinated with the on-going process of creating, 
harmonising and validating European security standards. There are several on-going cross-cutting 
efforts (such as CEN/CENELEC, ERNCIP etc.) as well as sectoral efforts (such as ECAC, 
ENISA, individual FP7 projects) where issues such as developing a harmonized European 
regulatory framework, standardization, common test methodologies and mutually-recognized 
European certification schemes are already being discussed and developed.  
6.2.2 Road Map of next steps 
The issue of testing capability building should be added to the issues to be dealt with in more 
detail within the potential future phase of ERNCIP, so that capability building can be better 
coordinated with the on-going processes of creating and harmonising standards. While ERNCIP 
can act as a catalyst and provide the framework for these processes, the relevant stakeholders 
within the European Commission will need to identify the most suitable funding framework.  
The way forward should include the following steps:  
1. Develop further the issues discussed in this paper by organizing an ERNCIP 
workshop on experimental and test capabilities in the EU with regard to CIP-related 
security solutions. This could be organised within the current ERNCIP programme 
in 2014. The aim of this workshop should be to reach a common general agreement 
among the key stakeholders about where capability building is most needed. 
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2. Where the need to enhance specific CIP-related experimental and testing 
capabilities in the EU is identified, multi-stakeholder sectoral thematic working 
groups should be established within ERNCIP, or the issue added to the mandate of 
an existing ERNCIP Thematic Group already dealing with other related issues. An 
appropriate timeline for addressing this issue would be around a year. 
3. These working groups should identify, list and evaluate the concrete know-how and 
infrastructure gaps and development challenges in EU-based experimental and 
testing capabilities within the respective sector, based on validated information. 
Each working group should prepare a sector capability and gap evaluation. 
4. This evaluation should include prioritisation; cost-benefit calculations of 
development needs, based on criticality, costs and other factors, should be made.  
5. Furthermore, in the evaluation, the working group should analyse the different 
solutions available to fill in the gaps. The alternatives include EU-led and EU-
funded approaches (e.g. JRC, FP7 projects), Member State–based approaches, 
market-based approaches (companies), combinations of the former (PPP), and other 
possible solutions.  
6. Finally, detailed ERNCIP recommendations, using the ERNCIP Expert Group 
(which represents the Member States’ CIP authorities) as an additional advisory 
body, should be made to the relevant policy, funding and implementation bodies.  
7. Ideally, these ERNCIP recommendations will be considered by the respective EU 
policy areas, with concrete policy conclusions articulated in relevant EU policy 
documents.  
8. Where a the need for more focussed approach towards international 
cooperation is identified such cooperation, particularly in RTD and training, 
should be enhanced with more coordinated European-third party programmes. The 
potential future ERNCIP (2015-2020) could work as a tool or platform also in this 
respect, and a framework of how the international partners could participate in 
ERNCIP Thematic Group meetings, as guest members, should be prepared.  
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Abstract 
 
One of ERNCIP’s goals is to identify gaps in European CIP-related experimental and testing capabilities, 
and to set up a wider debate on how to deal with these gaps. This report draws an indicative picture 
about the known state of European CIP-related test capabilities. The analysis is primarily based on an 
ERNCIP online questionnaire on the issue circulated at the end of 2012, which was completed by 65 
respondents representing different types of ERNCIP stakeholders. The ERNCIP Thematic Groups have 
also provided information about their respective capabilities and perceived gaps in their sectors. This 
report aims to provoke further debate among the ERNCIP stakeholder communities. 
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